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LEGAL-CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES ON
GERMANY'S POST-WORLD WAR II
STATUS
FERENC A. VALI*
The task of legal-constitutional theories may be twofold: they
may serve to explain some peculiar political situation or constitutional
development; they may also serve as guideline or yardstick for
political behavior and action. They are the product of some political-
constitutional situation; subsequently they may become the basis
of future policies. Such doctrines may shape political institutions,
constitutional and international enactments, and help to form public
policies.
Every government strives not only to be "legal,"- to conform to
certain constitutional rules, irrespective of the origin of these rules
-but also to be "legitimate," to be recognized as the only true and
genuine government of the nation. Of course, the criterion for
"legitimacy" may differ, which is why different groups may consider
different governments "legitimate."
In the past, in many European countries so-called "legitimist"
state doctrines opposed doctrines which gave preference to demo-
cratic principles of legitimacy. Revolutionary changes almost
invariably led to doctrinal explanations and support of the new
governments while other doctrines were upheld by others in support
of the ancien regime. Not only internal public policies depended on
the adoption or rejection of the legitimacy of one or other govern-
ment but also international recognition, friendly or inimical attitudes
of other governments hinged on the acceptability or inacceptability
of the principles involved. In 1815 the Holy Alliance pledged not to
recognize and to oppose governments which departed from the
traditional monarchical principle of legitimacy. A number of foreign
armed interventions were prompted by these and other legal-
constitutional doctrines.
In France, legitimist principles of government juxtaposed
throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries governments relying
on "popular will"; in Britain, the struggle between Jacobites, relying
on the doctrine of the "divine right of kings," and the theorists of
Professor of Government, University of Massachusetts. Doctor Juris, 1927, Budapest,
Ph.D., University of London, 1932, L.L.D. (honorary), Wayne State University, 1962.
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the Bill of Rights and of parliamentary democracy fought one another
for several decades. In Spain, the doctrine of succession as deter-
mined by the Salic Law was set against the right of the King and
Cortes to determine royal succession and this conflict of principles
originated the Carlist Wars.
But constitutional doctrines were not the exclusive preserve of
royal absolutism versus the democratic principle. In the United
States, the often theoretical struggle between the Federalists and
the defenders of states' rights,- between the Unionists and adherents
of the doctrine of interposition and nullification, and the right to
secession, eventuated the Civil War; it had not ended until recent
years.1 The potentialities inherent in the judicial review of con-
flicting federalist-versus-states' rights legislations, although not ex-
cluding resort to force, as during the Civil War, tended to enhance
legalism in politics, and also to confer political functions to the
courts.
2
Nor was the United States immune from nationalist political
doctrines: the concept of Manifest Destiny not only "overspread"
the North American continent but also promoted American civiliza-
tion and democracy in the Western hemisphere and elsewhere.
3
Thus, Germany is not the only country where political issues
were at times expressed and vindicated in terms of divergent
constitutional-legal doctrines. The legal-international status of the
Holy Empire, vis-a-vis its constituent members and the outside
world, lent itself to various interpretations often exploited by expan-
sionist member states and their greedy monarchs. The German
Confederation (Bund), successor to the Empire (Reich) in the post-
Napoleonic period similarly gave rise to various theoretical inter-
pretations. Those in Frankfurt in 184849 who supported centralism
and the establishment of a new Reich were liberals and nationalists;
their opponents conservatives and promoters' of "states' rights."
The eventual "small German" solution supported and achieved by
Bismarck, was the result of pragmatic politics and lacked an
ideological basis. It was to be a "greater Prussia," the Prussian
military and bureaucratic machine enlarged with permanent
"confederates." The theoretical justification of its Constitution was
merely that it "worked. ' 4 But this lack of a doctrinal basis of the
unified Germany under Bismarck led to an intensification of the
nationalist ideologies which became dominant under the young
Kaiser in the form of Pangermanism, and after the collapse of the
Weimar Republic, in the form of a racist-irrational Nazism.
1. A good presentation of these theories is provided by Bennett, AMERICAN THEORIES
Or FEDER LISM, 1964, passim.
2. See Havard, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES, 45-46 (1965).
3. See Kohn, AMERICAN NATIONALISM, 184, 189-190, 197-198 (1961).
4. Stern, THE POLITICS OF CULTURAL DESPAIR. A STUDY OF THE RISE OF GERMANIC
IDEOLOGY, XXV (1961).
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The Weimar Constitution of 1919, superseding the Bismarckian
"alliance of princes," was a step toward a more unitary state
system; but the member states (Lander) were to continue to exist
with significant local powers. After debate, the Prussian super-state
was left intact; it included about two-thirds of the territory and
population of the Republican Reich. While it was debatable whether
the 1871 German Empire was a Staatenbund (confederation of
sovereign states) or a Bundesstaat (federal state), the Weimar
Republic doubtlessly fell into the second type of decentralized govern-
mental system. However, under Nazism, Germany became a de facto
unitary state: Gleichschaltung (co-ordination) was implemented by
the imposition of party hierarchy over administration, by merging
state and Reich governments. While essentially maintaining the
Lander as administrative units, political government was exercised
through the administrative districts known as Gaue under the
leadership of the Gauleiter, the personal representative of the
Fuhrer. The Third Reich which, according to Hitler, was to last for
a thousand years, suffered a cataclysmic destruction in World War
II and with collapse of governmental power the chaotic vacuum of
Germanism was inherited in 1945 by the victorious powers which
dissected Germany into four Zones of Occupation.
II
The concluding Summit Conference of the war was held in
Potsdam in the second half of July 1945. Germany, within her
frontiers as they were on December 31, 1937-that is, before Hitler
embarked on his road to conquest-was accepted "as a starting
point" by the three leaders when they opened their discussion on
how to handle the German problem. It should be remembered here
that "Germany" had earlier different territorial meanings and passed
through many metamorphoses: there was once a German Kingdom,
the Holy Empire, and later the German Bund. There were long
periods when Germany was, in reality, more a geographical than a
political concept and, from 1806 to 1815, Germany, as a political
entity was even formally non-existent.
Under the wartime agreements between the United States,
Britain, and the Soviet Union defeated Germany was to be divided
into three and with the later inclusion of France, four Zones of
Occupation. Greater Berlin was to be under joint administration
of the Four Powers. In the economic field, however, the Potsdam
Protocol most emphatically decreed that: "During the period of
occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit."
This principle was simultaneously infringed by the provisions which
allowed the Soviet Union to satisfy its reparation claims by removals
from its own zone of occupation while the United States, Britain,
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and France were entitled to meet their reparation demands from
the Western zones. 5
Under the occupation statute Germany was to be governed
by the Control Council, consisting of the representatives of the Four
Occupation Powers. Of the three Potsdam Conference powers, the
Soviet Union was most eager to proceed with the creation of a German
central authority. But any such attempt was frustrated by the
French veto. The French government refused to accept the pro-
visions of the Potsdam Conference (where it was not represented)
which foresaw the establishment of central departments and a
central German government. A year after the end of the war the
entire German question appeared to be caught in a vicious circle:
the French refused the establishment of a central German admini-
stration and government, and insisted on a prior cession to France
of the Saar and the Rhineland; the Russians refused preparations
for a German Peace Treaty until a German government had first
been set up. To go ahead with the creation of a central German
administration by ignoring French opposition was vetoed by the
British. While the Soviet Union paid lip-service to German unity,
it prevented the management of Germany's economy as that of a
single unit. For years this struggle between German state unity
and fragmentation, and between economic order and chaos was
fought until American initiative opened the road for economic and
political rehabilitation of this country. Secretary of State Byrnes in
his speech in Stuttgart on September 6, 1946, said that if "complete
unification . . . of Germany's economy . . . cannot be secured, we
shall do everything in our power to secure the maximum possible
unification.", He also added that the German people, under proper
safeguards, "should now be given the primary responsibility for
the running of their own affairs. ' 7 The "maximum possible unifi-
cation" was that of the American and British Zones, increased
subsequently by the French Zone of Occupation. It was the area
on which the Federal Republic of Germany was formed in 1948.
German autonomy in the Western zones was first conceded to
the Lander. The Potsdam Protocol had provided that "the admini-
stration of affairs in Germany should be directed towards the
decentralization of the political structure." The Four Powers were
also in agreement that Prussia should be divided into her constituent
units forming several Lander. After the economic unification of
the Western Zones, failing Soviet co-operation, the Western Powers
decided "to do it alone." At the London Conference in the spring of
5. Mason, "Has Our Policy in Germany Failed?" FOREroN AFFAIRS, 579-590 (July.
1944-1961, p. 58.
6. Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Documents on Germany,
1944-1961, Washington, D. C., 58. (italics added).
7. Id. at 60.
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1948 the Ministers-President of the Lander in the Western Zones
were invited to convene a Constituent Assembly in order to prepare
a constitution for the approval of the German states.
In order to challenge the impending political integration of the
Western Zones of Germany, the Soviet Government stated on March
20, 1948, that because of independent Allied action "the Control
Council virtually no longer existed as the supreme body of authority
in Germany exercising quadripartite administration in that country."
The Soviet representative thereafter left the Council which was never
convened again. Thus the formal quadripartite Allied government
had come to an end and the partition of Germany began to take
constitutional forms.
The joint administration by the Four Powers of Berlin was also
soon to be disrupted. The excuse for the Soviet government to with-
draw from the Berlin Kommandature was the introduction of the
new Deutsche Mark issued by the Western Powers to replace the
devaluated Reichsmark. Again, for lack of Soviet agreement, the
Western Powers had proceeded alone. The right to mint or issue
money had always been considered an essential attribute of sover-
eignty; under the mixed system of authority in Berlin the issue of
new money became the formal reason of the battle for Berlin. Not
only the Allied administration of Berlin became split; the German
City administration became, in consequence of Soviet pressures,
divided into one exercising authority in the Western and the other
exercising authority in the Soviet sector of Greater Berlin.
Though the Berlin blockade had failed, Germany and Berlin
remained partitioned. While Berlin was isolated and supplied by
air, on July 1, 1948, the three Western Military Governors called
upon the Ministers-President of their respective Zones to convene
a Constituent Assembly to draft a democratic constitution of a federal
type "which is best adapted to the eventual re-establishment of
German unity at present disrupted."
The West German political leaders had serious misgivings
whether the establishment of a West German government would not
jeopardize the chances of reunification, whether it would not rather
strengthen and perpetuate Germany's partition. The advantages of
creating - for the time being, as it was believed - a German govern-
ment in the area of the three Western Zones were felt to outweigh
the dangers. It was also thought that the compromise formula of
creating only a "provisional" state would not foreclose the chances
of reunification.
For all these reasons it was considered important that no
definitive or permanent form should be given to the political unit to
be established and that its provisional and territorially incomplete
state should duly be emphasized. Therefore, the German leaders
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objected to naming the assembly which was to draft the constitution
a "Constituent Assembly" and the document to be drawn a
"Constitution." Instead, they suggested calling the meeting "Parlia-
mentary Council" and the constituent law of the new state:
Grundgesetz (Basic Law). The Basic Law itself was to be submitted
to the Land parliaments for approval rather than to a popular
referendum as suggested by the Military Governors.
The issue of greater centralism as against larger competences
to the individual Lander was again hotly debated when the Parlia-
mentary Assembly met in Bonn on September 1, 1948. But the
constant emphasis on the provisional character of the document to
be accepted facilitated the reaching of compromises. The name
given to the new political entity was Federal Government of Germany
(Bundesrepublik Duetschland) instead of Federation of German
States (Bund deutscher Lander) as proposed by "states' rights"
minded representatives. The debates lasted until May 8, 1949, when
the Parliamentary Council passed the Basic Law with 53 votes
against 12. Approval by two-thirds of the Lander was required. All
accepted it except Bavaria. Subsequently, when the Basic Law was
passed by all other states, Bavaria also joined them.8
In East Germany, in view of Western developments, the Soviets
undertook to organize their Zone into a state-like structure. A
People's Council adopted a constitution in March 1949 modelled,
strangely enough, after the Weimar Constitution of 1919 rather than
after Communist constitutions. After the Bonn Goverment went
into operation on the basis of the Grundgesetz, a new German
People's Council, on October 6, 1949, reconstituted itself as the
Provisional People's Chamber for the German Democratic Republic
(the name given to the German state of the East).
As a result of political and administrative developments, by 1949
Potsdam Germany (the area subjected to Four-Power control) had
become dissected into five parts: (1) the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, (2) the German Democratic Republic, (3) West Berlin, under
a Three-Power control, (4) East Berlin under direct Soviet control,
and (5) the Saar Territory, under French control.
At the time of present writing, the political-administrative units
in what used to be Potsdam Germany are reduced to three: East
Berlin had been merged into the German Democratic Republic, the
Saar was reunited with West Germany. The legal-constitutional
theories are now called to explain the constitutional and international
status of these units, their relations to the former Reich, their
relations to one another, and their duration as provisional or
permanent entities.
8. For the complete story of the creation of the West German state see Golay, tH'
FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1958); Merk, THE ORIGIN OF THE
WEST GERMAN REPUBLIC (1963).
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III
The Basic Law was passed by the overwhelming majority of the
Parliamentary Council and ratified by the parliaments of the Lander.
It is thus reasonable to believe that its principles represent the
quasi-unanimous consensus of the three major West German political
parties and of the West German electorate. By its own terms, the
Basic Law wishes to serve West Germany for a "transitional period"
only; by declaring itself temporary in character it had enacted
the fundamental goal and raison d'etre of the Federal Republic: to
preserve the "national and political" unity of the German people.
According to its Preamble, the Basic Law was enacted by the
German people in the Lander of the Western Zones and "also . . .on
behalf of those Germans to whom participation was denied." The
Preamble also called upon the entire German people "to achieve, by
free self-determination, the unity and freedom of Germany." German
politicians and publicists, therefore, do not fail to point out that
the furtherance of Germany's reunification is, under the terms of
the Basic Law, not only a political objective but also a duty pre-
scribed by the provisions of this Law. It should be pointed out,
however, that under German legal doctrine, the preamble of a
statute is not "normative," only programmatic (political). It is,
nevertheless, advanced with respect to the Basic Law that the
injunction to promote reunification of Germany is still to be con-
sidered "normative" by the support it received in various articles
of the main body of this constitutional document.9
The area of application of the Basic Law is not identical with
the areas of the Lander which, according to the Preamble, partici-
pated in its enactment. 10 Article 23 mentions, in addition to the
states of the Western Zones, "Greater Berlin" as one of the territories
where the Law applies. In still other parts of Germany, "it shall
be put into force on their accession. ' "" The Basic Law may thus
be extended to those parts of "Germany" where, because of the
existing international situation, it could not be made applicable,
and may become the constitution of reunited Germany. But the
West German organic law also provided for its own replacement by
a permanent constitution when it pronounced in Article 146 that it
shall cease to be in force "on the day on which a Constitution adopted
by a free decision of the German people comes into force."
9. Grewe, DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK DER NACHKRIEGSZEIT 234 (1960) ; Schuster,
DEUTSCHLANDS STAATLICHE EXISTENZ IM -WIDERSTREIT POLITISCHER UND RECHLICHER
GESICHTSPUNHTE, 1945-1963, pp. 138-142 (1963).
10. These were: Baden, Bavaria, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North-
Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland, Palatine, Schleswig-Holstein, Wurttemberg-Baden and
Wurttemberg-Hohenzollern.
Baden, Wurttemberg-Baden and Wurttemberg-Hohenzollern (formerly divided be-
tween the American and French Zones of Occupation) were united into the Land Wurtt-
emberg-Baden; after the return of the Saarland, the Federal Republic consisted of ten (to-
gether with Berlin, eleven) Lander.
11. The English translation of the Basic Law Is taken from CONSTITUTIONS AND CON-
STITUTIONALISM (Andrews ed. 1961).
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German political and legal scholars have pointed out that the
Basic Law as well as the official political philosophy held by the
Federal Government rest on three fundamental theses: (1) the
continued legal existence of the German nation-state; (2) the terri-
torial integrity of this Germany, as long as a Treaty of Peace, to
be concluded with an all-German government, has not changed the
territorial status quo; and (3) within the confines of this German
state there exists only one legitimate state-structure and govern-
ment-the Federal Republic of Germany and its government.
12
These are the principles which are generally accepted as guidelines
of governmental policies with regard to the dismembered status of
Germany. They, however, only partly explain the constitutional-
legal and international legal status of those political entities which
exercise governmental functions in the area of Germany. This
peculiar status almost daily raises problems which have to be met
by the policy-makers and also by the judiciary. Thus the circum-
stances surrounding divided Germany have engendered constitutional
and legal polemics concerning the survival of the German state
and the legal position of the two German governments, as well as
the controversial situation of Berlin.
The constitutional-legal theories generally cover three specific
controversial points which they undertake to explicate in terms of
known constitutional or international legal tenets: (1) continuity
or discontinuity of the former German Reich; (2) legal relationship
of the Federal Republic with the former German state; and (3) the
question of legitimacy of one, or more than one, German political
entity. It is, of course, understood that the above mentioned three
areas of controversial approaches often overlap or are logically
dependent on one another.
(1) Continuity or discontinuity
The complete surrender of Germany, Allied assumption of
integral control over the country, and the subsequent revival of a
native governmental machinery gave rise to various doctrinal
interpretations. Outside Germany (but also by a few German
scholars) it was held that the German state, as a consequence of
unconditional military and political surrender, had ceased to exist
(discontinuity theories). But as to the post-surrender status of
Germany, opinion varied from asserting
(a) the existence of an inter-Allied condominium" (that
Germany had come under the joint sovereignty of the four
Occupation Powers); or
(b) that Germany had become internationally a terra
12. Grewe, op. cit., supra note 9, at 95; Schuster, op. cit., supra note 9, at 261-262.
13. The chief protagonist of the condominium doctrine was Relsen, The Legal Status
of Germany according to the Declaration of Berlin, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATfONAL
LAW, 519 (1945); same author, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 262 (1952).
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nullius, that is no man's land, under international law. "
Others, mostly West German scholars, developed the doctrine
of German state survival: the German state as a legal entity had
never ceased to exist, it had only lost its self-governing capacity to
the inter-Allied Government. 5 This view is said to have received
official confirmation by the wording of the Four Power Declaration
of Berlin, June 5, 1945, and also by the Potsdam Protocol. 6
From these official texts and from the various statements of
Allied leaders during and following World War II it appears that
there never was any intention to annex (either by dividing her or
by turning her into a condominium) Germany as a whole. Inter-
national practice clearly indicates that it is correct to distinguish
between the (temporary) exercise of sovereign powers and the full-
ness of sovereign authority owned by independent states. The concept
of "occupation" also contradicts the thesis of complete loss of German
statehood; one does not "occupy" one's own territory. On the other
hand, it is also clear that German state power remained dormant
for a number of years, that Germany was a ward in the hands of
the occupying Powers which exercised full control internally and
represented Germany externally.
If we assume, as we have to, that the German state did not
cease legally to exist, the relationship between this German state
and the new political entities has to be examined next. On the other
hand, if we stand on the thesis that the German state has ceased
to exist, the new political entities are to be regarded as new states,
successors to the former Reich.
(2) Identity, temporary substitution or succession
Followers of the now prevailing "continuity doctrine" are divided
14. Virally, DIE INTERNATIONALE VERWALTUNG DEUTSCHLANDS 29 (1948).
15. Among others, Kaufman, DEUTSCHLANDS RECHSTLAGE UNTER DER BESATZUNG (1948)
Alfred Verdross, Die volkerrechtliche Stellung Deutschlands von 1945 bis zur Bilduun/ der
westdeutschen Regierung, ARCHIv DES VOLKERRECHTS, 129, 1951/52; Bathurst and Simp-
son, GERMANY AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY, 188-195, 196-198 (1956); Theodor
Eschenburg, Dm DEUTSCHE FRAGE-VERFASSUNGPOBLEMS PER WIEDERVEREINIGUNG (1959).
16. The Declaration of the Assumption of Supreme Authority by the Four Occupation
Powers contained in its Preamble the following statements:,There is no central Government of authority in Germany capable of accepting
responsibility for the maintenance of order, the administration of the country and com-
pliance with the requirements of the victorious Powers."
"It is in these circumstances necessary, without prejudice to any subsequent de-.
cisions that may be taken respecting Germany, to make provisions for the cessation of
any further hostilities on the part of German armed forces, for the maintenance of order
in Germany and for the administration of the country, and to announce the immediate
requirements with which Germany must comply."
"The Governments of the United States of America, The Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of the French Re-
public, hereby assume supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers
possessed by the German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal, or
local government or authority. The assumption, for the purposes stated above, of the said
authority and powers does not effect the annexation of Germany."
"The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Government of the French Re-
public, will hereafter determine the boundaries of Germany or any part thereof and the
status of Germany or of any area at present being part of German territory."
Committee on Foreign Relations, op. cit., Supra note 6 at 13.
The Potsdam Protocol of Aug. 1, 1945, also emphasizes the "occupation" of Ger-
many thus discarding any intention of annexation. It provided that "for the time being,
no contral German Government shall be established." id. at 32.
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between those who identify the Federal Republic with "Germany,"
either by explaining its status
(a) as a "Germany," reduced in size (contraction theory)
or
(b) as conterminous with the German state of 1937 but
de facto prevented from exercising authority beyond its
factual border (kernel or core-state theory) .1
Protagonists of both above doctrines are again divided in their
explanation of the legal status of Eastern Germany. This area is
considered either
(a) as being under "foreign occupation" or
(b) a terra nullius (no man's land) under international
law.
Others again operate with the so-called "roof" theory (Dach
Theorie). This is a two-state doctrine but not one which is professed
by the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union. The
practical conclusions of this doctrine are not basically dissimilar
from those of the single-state doctrines. This "unreal" two state
theory differentiates between the still dormant all-German state
(which used to be called the German Reich) and the rump state
(Federal Republic) which functions within part of its territory.
Under this conceptual approach, the all-German state has so far
failed to recover its capacity to function, while the Federal Republic
possesses almost all the prerequisites of a sovereign state and is,
because of its democratic legitimacy, entitled to represent, as a
kind of trustee, the still inactive all-German state. Accordingly, the
Federal Government is thus one German government but not the
German government and, at present, there is no other German
government. The "so-called German Democratic Republic," accord-
ing to this view, fails to possess the characteristics of statehood
because of its complete lack of popular democratic legitimacy.
This doctrinal explanation appears to be the official view of the
Social Democratic Party on the legal status of Germany and of the
Federal Republic."'
Finally, according to the theories which reject the continuity of
Germany, the Federal Republic is regarded a new state, sole succes-
sor to the Reich but not identical with it.19 Only the German nation
has remained but not the former German state. Such a view, how-
ever, is by no means incompatible with the rejection of the legitimate
17. For a systematic presentation of these doctrines see Vocke, Politische Gefahren
der Theorien uber Deutachlands Rechtslage, EUROPA-ARCRIV, 10199-10215 (1957) ; Schuster,
DEUTSCHLANDS STAATHCHE EXISTENZ IM WIDERSTRIETr POLITISCHER UND RECHLICHER
GESICI-TSPUNKTE, 1945-1963 (1963).
18. The principal proponent of this theoretical view is Arndt, DER DEUTSCHE STAAT ALS
RECHTPROBLEM (1960); same author, Deutschland als Warheit und Wagnis, DiE ZEIT,
(March 1954).
19. See Munch, uur deutschen Frage, in the volume GIST ES ZWEI DEUTSCHE STAA-
TEN?. 20-21 (1963).
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existence of the East German state. The German Democratic
Republic is only a de facto entity upheld by a foreign power. Still,
according to another view, the German area east of the border of
the Federal Republic is considered "unredeemed" (irredenta)
national territory under foreign domination.
20
The Basic Law, by its reference to "Germany," as distinguished
from the Federal Republic (the reference to the Reich appears
whenever the pre-1945 situation is meant), by its insistence on one
German citizenship, by its claim to valid extension over the whole
of "Germany," is said to be in conformity with the core-state doctrine
(which is probably the one representing the views of the CDU/CSU
governmental party) or an interpretation of the roof-state doctrine
which would recognize limited statehood for the Federal Republic
but deny it to the German Democratic Republic. The practical
interpretations drawn from both these doctrines appear in the policy
and statements of the Federal Government and of the major parties:
the non-recognition of the East German state and the so-called
Hallstein Doctrine. The constitutional-legal acceptance of the
Federal Republic, as a continuing form of the German state created
between 1867 and 1871 makes the demand for reunification more
than a policy objective: it is the justification of the very existence
of today's free German state.
Under the Basic Law there is only one kind of citizenship:
German citizenship. There is no special citizenship reserved for
the inhabitants of the Federal Republic. Therefore Germans from
West Germany hardly ever call themselves "Federal Republicans"
(Bundesrepublikaner or Bundesburger) but simply "Germans." In-
habitants of East Germany, wishing to differentiate themselves in
third countries from those of the West, occasionally call themselves
"Democratic Germans" which may give rise to some misunder-
standings.
"Germany" in the meaning of the Basic Law, is the area which
was the German Reich on December 31, 1937 (similar to the meaning
of the word under the Potsdam Protocol). Citizens of the Reich,
as it was at that date, their descendants and also refugees or
expellees of German stock, are "Germans" within the meaning of
the Basic Law. 21 It follows that no citizenship of the German
Democratic Republic would be recognized by any agency of West
Germany.
State names can have particular legal significance. It should
be remembered that the West German state does not call itself
20. These various doctrines are represented by Reuther, BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
UND DEUTSCHES REICH (1951) (secessionist doctrine); von der Heydte, Deutschlands
Rechtslage, FRIEDENSWARTE, 323 (1950/51) (roof-theory); Rumpf, Aktuelle Rechtsfragen
der Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands, EUROPA ARCHlV, 9723 (1957).
21. Art. 116, par. 1.
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German Federal Republic but rather Federal Republic of Germany
(while in East Germany no reluctance was felt to call their state
German Democratic Republic). In German the difference is even
more expressive: West Germany is Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
instead of Deutsche Bundesrepublik. The Federal Republic's official
name thus denotes its claim to represent all of Germany.
(3) Legitimacy, singularity and two German states doctrine
The reasons for West Germany's legal position of refusing
recognition of statehood to the East German political unit has already
been discussed together with the questions of identity. At this point,
the legal arguments for the claim of the Federal Republic to be
the only German state and its right to represent alone the German
people are to be examined.
Immediately after the Soviet bestowal of sovereignty on the
German Democratic Republic, the three Western Powers, in a joint
statement issued by the three High Commissioners for West Germany,
refused to recognize the change in status and declared that they
would continue to consider the Soviet Union the Power internationally
responsible for the "Soviet Zone of Germany."
The Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference held in London from
September 28 to October 3, 1954, contained the following statement
by the eight Western governments:
They consider the Government of the Federal Republic
as the only German Government freely and legitimately
constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as
the representative of the German people in international
affairs.
In return, the Federal Republic had declared:
• . . never to have recourse to force to achieve the re-
unification of Germany or the modification of the present
boundaries of the Federal Republic of Germany, and to
resolve by peaceful means any disputes which may arise
between the Federal Republic and other States.
22
The Paris Treaty of October 23, 1954, which conferred sovereignty
on Western Germany, furthermore provided:
The Signatory States are agreed that an essential aim
of their common policy is a peaceful settlement for the whole
of Germany, freely negotiated between Germany and her
former enemies, which should lay the foundation for a lasting
peace. They further agree that the final determination of
the boundaries of Germany must await such a settlement.
The Western Powers are thus bound not to recognize the East
German state because such an international act would violate their
22. See von Oppen, (ed.) DOCUMENTS ON GERMANY UNDER OCCUPATION, 1954-1955,
p. 600-609 (1955).
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commitment to consider the Federal Republic of Germany as "the
only German Government."
Although international lawyers disagree whether there is or can
be under certain circumstances an obligation to recognize a new
state or government, the practice of most states over the last fifty
years demonstrates that recognition of states or governments is not
considered an obligation but a political decision guided by consider-
ations of foreign policy.
The recognition of the independence of a state which has seceded
from another or which has arisen as a result of a dismemberment of
a state poses problems which, in many respects, differ from those
cases where recognition means formal acknowledgement of the
existence of a state and the resumption of diplomatic and other
relations with it. For a truncated state to recognize the sovereign
existence of its severed member implies, inter alia, the final and
irrevocable acknowledgement of its own dismemberment. There
are historical precedents in which states have refused, for many
decades, to recognize the loss of former territories.
23
But West Germany not only refuses diplomatic communication
with the German Democratic Republic; she denies its natural exist-
ence as an independent political entity. German legal and political
theorists point out that under the generally accepted criteria of
international law required for the existence of an independent state
(territory, population and governmental authority), East Germany
cannot qualify as a state. Though it has territory where to operate,
it possesses no population willing to support this "state" (evidence
for this is the constant mass exodus until the erection of the Berlin
Wall and the revolt of June 17, 1953, suppressed by the Russians);
its government is said to be "pseudo-autochthonous," in reality thrust
upon the unwilling population by a foreign government; the govern-
ment authority could not be maintained without the presence and
support of the Soviet Army. It is thus, we are told, not the population
which supports the regime but the Communist Party, disguised as
a government, which controls the population by coercion.
24
For the leaders of the Federal Republic, including the major
political parties, neither a full (so-called de jure) nor a limited
(de facto) diplomatic recognition of the East German regime is
conceivable; even the mental acknowledgement of the existence of
the German Democratic Republic as a normal "state" is rejected.
23. For instance, Spain refused recognition to the secessionist Seven Provinces (Nether-
lands) from 1572 to 1648. China, the United States and other democratic powers, refused
to recognize the Japanese puppet-state of Manchukuo (Manchuria) after its establishment
in 1931. The Arab states have refused the recognition of Israel since its foundation in
1948. Neither South and North Korea, nor South and North Vietnam, nor the People's
Republic of China (Peking) and the Republic of China (Taiwan), all partitioned or
truncated states, recognize one another.
24. See, e.g., Stein, Ist die 'Deutsche Demokratische Republik' ein Staat? 85 ARchrv
DES OFFENTLICHEN RECHTS, 363-391 (April 1961 (4).
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That is why official circles in West Germany warn against
"upgrading" the "Soviet Zone," that is, acknowledging it, not diplo-
matically, but in its physical existence as a "state." This is a far
cry from even de facto diplomatic recognition.
In the light of the West German state doctrines, any kind of
recognition or near-recognition of the East German state would be
an abandonment of the claim to German unity. It would be-accord-
ing to these views-a violation of the fundamental principles which
the Federal Republic professes, a denial of the raison d'etre of the
West German state. To accept the legitimate existence of the
German Democratic Republic would be an open breach of the West
German constitutional system embodied in the Basic Law. Under
its own constitutional rules, the Federal Republic considers itself
the sole legitimate state in the German area and the only spokesman
in behalf of the German people.
In the case of the Federal Republic, the legal reasons for non-
recognition of the East German state are much more profound and
theoretically substantiated than for instance, those which the United
States alleges against the recognition of Communist China. In inter-
national law and diplomacy one of the non-aggressive weapons is
non-recognition; the state or government whose legal existence or
legitimacy is denied or doubted is officially though not literally
ignored. This may cause inconveniences to both parties. Whether
one's own disadvantages outweigh those of the non-recognized state
is a point of expediency not one of law.
The Federal Republic maintains manifold contacts with East
German authorities though it is very careful to keep these contacts
on a lower or technical level; they are restricted to exchanges
between railroad, postal, and other technical administrations. For
trade and other administrative contacts with East Germany a special
non-governmental agency is being maintained in Berlin. All these
contacts, seemingly conflicting with the thesis of non-recognition, are
supported by the prevailing legal doctrine: the Federal Republic
while insisting on the legal non-existence of an East German state
also insists on the continued existence of Germany as a whole. It
wishes to preserve unity of Germany, as far as feasible, but desires
to isolate the East German regime. Therefore Bonn opposes trade
of other Western countries with the German Democratic Republic
but continues to maintain trade contacts itself: theoretically, it only
carries on business within "Germany." If all this appears inconsis-
tent, it is simply due to the ambiguities of the situation and the
unavoidable ambivalence of a doctrinal position which implies
seemingly inconsistent courses of action.
It is not for the first time that legal concepts appear fictitious.
German unity, the continued existence of Germany, and the legal
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non-existence of an East German political entity are fictions. But
both the West Germans and the Allies have decided to operate with
these fictions because they consider them useful, expedient, and
necessary. Legal fictions may perform wholesome tasks in inter-
national life as they do in the domestic field; they may help to
support what is considered right and just. West German legal
scholars submit that the pretense of running a democratic state in
the East is more mendacious, and therefore fictitious, than their
assumption of the unity of Germany. In their view the German
Democratic Republic is the real fiction: it is neither "German,"
nor "Democratic," nor even a "Republic."
The Western Powers and all the signatories of the revised
Brussels Treaty have endorsed the thesis that the government of the
Federal Republic is the only legitimate government in Germany.
The relevant declarations always speak of the Federal Republic as
the government "in" and not "of" Germany. This subtle differenti-
ation may indicate that there might be one day another legitimate
government in Germany. Or, it may also indicate the support for
the thesis that there is a theoretical, now dormant, all-Germany,
and the Federal Republic, within the area of its own jurisdiction,
is the ersatz government as long as the present provisional situation
lasts.
Thus, the doctrine and practice of the singularity of the German
state, as embodied in the Federal Republic, diametrically oppose
the theory of two German states, three if we include Berlin, which
is the official and doctrinal prevailing thesis of the East German
regime and its supporter, the Soviet Union. The doctrinal inter-
pretation of the German Democratic Republic by its own leaders
and jurists is an image of the ambivalent attitude displayed by
the Soviet Union in its German policy.
IV
In 1949, when the German Democratic Republic was formally
established, it wished to consider itself as the "core" of an all-
German state. In 1950, the official attitude held the thesis that two
new states had emerged within the area of Germany and, therefore,
the German Democratic Republic was not even a successor-state
to the Reich. (This is similar to the early position of the Soviet state
disclaiming any successorship to Tsarist Russia). After 1955, how-
ever, the now "sovereign" East German state claimed the Demo-
cratic Republic together with the Federal Republic were joint succes-
sors to the former all-German state.
Thus, in the first phase, the East German government recognized
the continuity of Germany after the collapse in 1945; in the second
phase all continuity was rejected; in the third and present phase,
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domestic discontinuity but international continuity, in the form of
successorship, is being claimed.
25
The thesis of complete discontinuity, if upheld, would have contra-
dicted the Soviet demand for conclusion of a Peace Treaty (there
being no need to conclude such a treaty with a "new" state) and
would have barred the German Democratic Republic from any
claim to properties or assets of the Reich abroad.
26
The theoretical basis of the East German legal position (which-
ever position it may be) is anchored in the Marxist-Leninist doctrine
of state. The state being, by this view, a power-structure serving the
purposes of the "ruling class," the state itself undergoes a change
whenever another "ruling class" takes over. The German Demo-
cratic Republic, it is claimed, is a country where the proletariat has
seized power, and therefore it is a "new" state. Nevertheless,
internationally, it is a member of the international community.
The text of the East German Constitution does not, in many
essentials, harmonize with constitutional reality and the two-state
theory. According to its Preamble, "The German People has given
itself a Constitution." Article 1, paragraph 1, announces that
"Germany is an indivisible democratic Republic; she is formed by
the German Lander."27 Article 1, paragraph 4, provides: "There
is only one German citizenship." Article 118, paragraph 1, states
that "Germany forms a unitary customs and trade-area, surrounded
by a common customs-frontier." Thus, the Constitution distinguishes
between "Germany" (meaning all Germany, without closer terri-
torial definition), the "Republic" (meaning the German Democratic
Republic), and the Lander."
The Constitution of the German Democratic Republic has only
been slightly amended since its adoption. Indeed, it could well have
been replaced by a new one better suited to the requirements of the
East German Communist state. Failure to do so may be explained
by the ideological disdain of the Communists for constitution and law
in general; but it may also have reflected a wish to leave the door
open for reunification. It should be remembered that the present
Constitution was originally intended to become the constitutional
instrument for a unified Germany; thus it was tailored to suit the
legislative requirements of the entire country. A constitution based
more on the realities of the Communist Party state (copied after
the Stalinist Constitution of 1936, as were most of the constitutions
25. See Schuster, op. cit supra note 9 at 164-172.
26. See Mampel, DIE VERFASSUNG DER SOWJETISCHIEN BESATZTJNrSZONE DEUTSC-ILANDS,
17-18 (1962). The Federal Republic, unlike the D.D.R., not only clairns to be the (sole)
successor to the Reich (or, according to other views, to be identical with It) but was
ready to assume liabilities of pre-war and Nazi Germany by paying debts and indemnities.
27. The Soviet Zone and the German Democratic Republic consisted originally of five
Lander (Brandenburg, Saxony, Thuringia, Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg). In 1952,
however, the Lander were (without the required constitutional procedure) dissolved and
East Germany divided into 14 administrative districts.
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in the East European People's Democracies) might have discouraged
all opportunities for establishing a Confederation of the German
states or any other organized collaboration between the two severed
parts of Germany, as had frequently been proposed by Moscow
and the East German leaders. Accordingly, the German Democratic
Republic, while advertising the two-state or, more recently, the
three-state (including West Berlin) theory, has not given up its
pretenses to becoming a partner or constituent part of a united
Germany.
The paradox of the German situation is well revealed by the
nature of the West and East German constitutions: the former is
intended to be a transitional, provisional legal instrument in expecta-
tion of reunification; the latter is a definitive constitutional document,
intended for Germany as a whole, but serving a political entity
which is officially (though not finally) committed to German
separatism.
V
The controversial legal status of Berlin lends itself to conflicting
doctrinal interpretations: one may distinguish between West Ger-
man, East German, and Allied positions.
(1) Under Article 23 of the Basic Law its provisions apply in
"Greater Berlin." According to the official West German view,
sanctioned by the courts, Berlin is a Land of the Federal Republic.
It is, however, admitted in deference to actual practice, that the
application of the Basic Law and of West German law, in general,
is de jure restricted by the continued exercise of authority by the
Occupation Powers in West Berlin. Territorially, these applications
are also limited by the de facto division of Greater Berlin.
Just as the Federal Government considers itself the only legiti-
mate government of Germany, the Magistrate of (West) Berlin
regards itself the only legitimate municipal authority of Berlin.
The Governing Mayor of Berlin claims to have jursidiction over
the entire Greater Berlin area, even if temporarily prevented from
exercising such authority in the Eastern sector of the city.
28
(2) Article 2, paragraph 2, of the East German Constitution of
October 7, 1949 provided that: "The capital of the Republic is
Berlin." The German Democratic Republic was formed on the
territory of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, and Berlin was, under
the agreement between the United States, Britain, and the Soviet
Union of September 12, 1944 (to which, subsequently, France also
adhered), an area to be administered jointly by the four Occupation
28. See Plischke, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF CONTEMPORARY BERLIN, especially pp.
63-74 (1963); Schuster, DEUTSCHLANDS STAATLICHE EXISTENZ IM WIDERSTREIT POLITISCHER
UND REcHTLICHER GESICHTSPUNKTE, 1945-1963, pp. 103-106 (1963).
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Powers. The Communist legal interpretation of Berlin's status is
not entirely consistent. It was maintained that Berlin, as a whole,
belonged to the D. D. R. until the Soviet-East German friendship
treaty of June 12, 1964 introduced a new view by declaring that
West Berlin is an "independent political unit."
According to views set forth in East German publications,
Greater Berlin originally belonged to the Soviet Zone; the three
Western Powers were subsequently given a right of administration
in their respective sectors but they failed to obtain "sovereignty."
The Western Powers, by their violation of the Potsdam Agreement
(or other agreements pertinent to the Four-Power status of Germany)
forfeited their rights to be in Berlin. When the Soviet Union trans-
ferred its sovereign rights over the Soviet Zone to the German
Democratic Republic the entire area of Berlin became part of this
state. Consequently, the Western Powers remain in their sectors
of Berlin only "by sufferance" or "toleration" of the German
Democratic Republic.29 Inconsistent with this opinion is Ulbricht's
view that the border between East and West Berlin is a "state
frontier." 0
The municipal authorities of East Berlin claim jurisdiction for
the entire Berlin area though their authority does not extend beyond
the Wall. On the other hand, from 1955 on East Berlin has been
integrated into the German Democratic Republic and considered as
a special District (Bezirk). 1 In October 1958 Ulbricht stated that
the "democratic" section of Berlin was no longer subject to any
military occupation.3 2 On August 23, 1962 even the office of the
Soviet Commandant in Berlin was abolished.
The second campaign for Berlin, initiated by Khrushchev in
November 1958 relied theoretically on the contention that all Greater
Berlin is part of the D. D. R. The Soviet leader's address before the
Polish state delegation inveighed against the violations of the
"Potsdam Agreement" by the Western Powers and insisted that the
obligations derived from this agreement "had outlived them-
selves: ,,31
The time has obviously arrived for the signatories of the
29. See Herbert Kroger, Zu einigen Fragen des staatsrechlichen Status von Berlin,
DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK, January 1948; WewJura and Lukashuk, International Legul
Aspects of the West Berlin Problem, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1963, No. 4, pp. 37-42.
30. See Walter Ulbricht's speech at the XVII German Workers' Conference, Leipzig,
March 9, 1963; Politische Studien, 333 (May-June, 1963).
31. DOKUMENTE ZUR BERLIN-FRAGE, 1944-1961, pp. 251-296 (1962).
32. Op cit p. 296, but Khrushchev in his speech of November 10, 1958, threatened to
hand over to the D.D.R. "the functions in Berlin that are still exercised by Soviet
agencies." Embree (ed.), THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GERMAN QUESTION, 19 (1963).
33. In referring to the Potsdam Agreement Khrushehev committed a gaffe which was
exploited by Secretary of State Dulles in his news conference when the latter stated:
"... it seemed as though Mr. Khrushchev had Spoken initially without the benefit
of legal advice which is, of course, a very bad thing to do that he has based his case
upon alleged breaches of the Potsdam Agreement."
"Now, the rights and status of the allies in Berlin and the responsibilities and
obligations of the Soviet Union do not In any way whatsoever derive from the Potsdam
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Potsdam Agreement to renounce the remnants of the occupa-
tion regime in Berlin and thereby make it possible to create
a normal situation in the capital of the German Democratic
Republic.
8 '
Khrushchev's error in referring to the wrong document with
regard to Berlin was corrected in the Soviet diplomatic note of
November 27, 1958. Here the Soviet Union formally denounced the
Agreement of September 12, 1944, concerning the Zones of Occupa-
tion and the administration of Greater Berlin, and suggested that
the most correct and natural way to solve the
problem would be for the Western part of Berlin, now ac-
tually detached from the German Democratic Republic, to
be reunited with its eastern part and for Berlin to become
a unified city within the state in whose territory it is sit-
uated.385
But the Soviet note wished to acknowledge the development of
West Berlin, so different from that of the Eastern part of that city,
and also the desire of the West Berliners to preserve their present
way of life. Accordingly the proposal of the Soviet Government for
West Berlin ran as follows:
... in view of all these considerations, the Soviet
Government on its part would consider it possible to solve
the West Berlin question at the present time by the conver-
sion of West Berlin into an independent political unit-a free
city, without any state, including both existing German
states, interfering in its life. Specifically, it might be pos-
sible to agree that the territory of the free city be de-
militarized and that no armed forces be contained therein.
The free city, West Berlin, could have its own government
and run its own economic, administrative, and other af-
fairs.86
The Soviet note further expressed the view that
• . . the German Democratic Republic's agreement to
set up on its territory such an independent political or-
ganism as a free city of West Berlin would be a concession,
a definite sacrifice on the part of the German Democratic
Republic for the sake of strengthening peace in Europe,
and for the sake of the national interest of the German
people as a whole."7
Agreements. Indeed that subject is, I am told by my own legal adviser, not even men-
tioned in the Potsdam Agreements..."
if the Soviet Union takes the position that the Potsdam Agreement is non-
existent, the consequences of that would be not to destroy our rights in Berlin, because
they don't rest upon the Potsdam Agreement at all, but it might greatly compromise the
territorial claims of Poland which do rest upon the Potsdam Agreement primarily." U. S.
Department of State and Staff of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 87th Congress
1st Session, DOcUMENTS ON GERMANY, 1944-1961, pp. 346-237 (1961).
34. DOcUMENTS ow GERMANY, 1944-1961, op. cit., supra Note 9 at 342. (italics are
added).
35. Id. at 359 (italics are added).
36. Id. at 360.
87. Id. at 361 (Italics are added).
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The West German and the Communist views on the status of
West Berlin and of Berlin, as a whole, are in direct conflict. And
opposed to the Communist position is the Western view, itself not
totally consistent with the official doctrine of the Federal Republic.
(3) Under the "Protocol on Zones of Occupation and Administra-
tion of the 'Greater Berlin' area" of September 12, 1944, the United
States, Britain, and the Soviet Union (and subsequently France)
agreed that Germany would, for the purposes of occupation, be
divided into three (subsequently four) zones, to be allotted to each
of the three (four) Powers, and "a special Berlin area, which will
be under joint occupation by the three (four) Powers. ' 8 The Four-
Power statement of June 5, 1945 on Zones of Occupation in Germany
further clarified the situation of Berlin:
The area of 'Greater Berlin' will be occupied by forces
of each of the four Powers. An Inter-Allied Governing Au-
thority (in Russian, Komendatura) consisting of four Com-
mandants, appointed by their respective Commanders-in-
Chief, will be established to direct jointly its administration. SS
On the basis of these unequivocal texts the Western Powers have
denied that any part of Berlin was ever part of the Soviet Zone of
Occupation. The Western Powers gained occupancy of their sectors
in Berlin in return for the withdrawal of their forces from the zone
allotted to the Soviets in July 1945. In addition to their treaty rights,
the Western Powers also derive their status in Berlin from a right
of conquest, that is, their right to participate in Germany's occupation
with sovereign authority as a result of Germany's military defeat
and unconditional surrender. This would imply that the Allied status
in Berlin is not derivative, transmitted by either the Germans or
the Russians, but, under international law, an original right of
sovereign power. Such a right can neither be forfeited nor lapse
except by voluntary relinquishment or mutual agreement. The
Western Powers maintain that their right to stay in Berlin is inde-
pendent of the survival or efficaciousness of the Potsdam Agreement
or any other Inter-Allied agreement. They also deny that any of
their actions have given cause for the denunciation of these agree-
ments.40
The Soviet-East German contention which attempts to differenti-
ate between "exercise of supreme authority" and "administration,"
the first being vested in the Commanders-in-Chief of the Zones of
Occupation, the latter carried out by the Berlin Kommandatura, is
38. Id. at 1.
39. Id. at 19.
40. See THE IssuEs IN THE BERLIN-GERMAN CRISIS, with contributions by Bowie, Conant,
Debevoise, McCloy, Munroe, and Schwarz, (The Hammarskjold Forums), 24-39.
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based on a one-sided reading of the relevant texts and rejected
by the Western Powers.
4 1
In the view of the Western Powers, the Soviet withdrawal from
the Kommandatura in 1948 did not destroy the authority of this
organ; according to this view, the administrative machinery under
the quadripartite agreements cannot be abolished without the ap-
proval of the three Western Powers. The Kommandatura, reduced
to the representatives of the three Western Allied and de facto
limited in its exercise of functions to the three Western sectors of
Berlin, continues to act under the war-time and postwar arrange-
ments. It considers the Soviet seat vacant and to be filled at the
will of the Soviet Commandant of Berlin. When, on August 23, 1962,
the Soviet Government announced the abolition of the office of Soviet
Commandant in Berlin (though certain "limited functions" were
still to be continued by the Soviet Army), the three Western Powers
protested and declared that such a unilateral renunciation could not
impair the rights of the Allies in the city. Furthermore, the Western
statement emphasized that
the the Soviet announcement can in no way affect
the unity of Berlin as a whole. Despite the illegality of the
wall and the brutality of the East German authorities in
preventing the inhabitants of East Berlin from leaving that
area, Berlin remains a single city. No unilateral action by
the Soviet Government can change this.
42
From the Western point of view, the administrative incorporation
of East Berlin into the German Democratic Republic was illegal and
a breach of the Berlin Agreements. Similarly, the entry of East
German armed forces (which raised and protected the Berlin Wall)
was a violation of these agreements.4
3
At times, the Soviet military authorities attempted to regain
a foothold in the administration of West Berlin but the Western
Allies would only agree if the Soviet Union acknowledged that East
Berlin, too, was subject to four-power control.
44
The Allied persistence in holding strictly to the letter of occupa-
tion rights in Berlin has occasionally created friction between the
Western Commandants and the Berlin and Bonn authorities. To
41. The Allied statement on "Control Machinery in Germany," dated June 5, 1945, pro-
vided for the "administration of Greater Berlin" whereas the Control Council, composed
of the four Commanders-in-Chief, was designated, by the same instrument, to exercise
supreme authority. However, the Allied statement of the same day (see above) spoke of
occupation by the Allied forces of Berlin, the same term used for the taking over of the
Zones by the Allied. The Soviet argument is also refuted by the text of the September 12,
1944, agreement on the occupation of Germany. See Legien, THE FOUR POWER AGREEMENTS
ON BERLIN, 11-12 (1961).
42. New York Times, August 24, 1962, p. 2, col. 4. (italics added).
43. The Soviet Government lodged protests against alleged recruitment of West Ber-
liners into the West German Bundeswehr, protests rejected as unwarranted by the Allies.
Similar protests were launched by the West against recruitment Into the East German
Volksarmee in Berlin and the entry of such forces into East Berlin; DOKUMENTS ZUR
BERLIN-FRAGE, 1944-1966, pp. 442-446.
44. New York Times, December 12, 1964, p. 1, col. 3.
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safeguard their authority the Western Powers refused to recognize
Berlin as the twelfth Land of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Thus the Three-Partite Kommandatura refused on August 29, 1950,
to approve paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 1 of the Constitution of
Berlin. The two paragraphs declared respectively that "Berlin is a
Land of the Federal Republic of Germany," and that "the Basic
Law and Laws of the Federal Republic of Germany are binding in
Berlin. '""4 Any act passed by the Berlin House of Representatives
had required approval by the Kommandatura before becoming effect-
ive. Under the practice developed as a consequence of the Allied
refusal to accept Berlin as part of the Federal Republic, the Berlin
Parliament now formally endorses the laws passed by the legislature
in Bonn, which thereafter obtain the approval of the Allied
Kommandatura.
Before 1958 the Bundestag held sessions in Berlin once in each
legislative term in order to demonstrate the city's symbolic signifi-
cance as the historical capital of Germany. After the opening of
Khrushchev's campaign against Berlin, Allied intervention tempor-
arily prevented the holding of further parliamentary sessions in
Berlin. But the "right" of the Bundestag to sit in Berlin was formally
upheld.
West Berlin is represented by eight deputies in the Bundestag
of Bonn; they exercise a purely consultative function.4 6 Strangely
enough, despite the total integration of East Berlin into the German
Democratic Republic, the thirteen deputies of Berlin have no voting
rights in the Volkskammer which holds its sessions in East Berlin.47
Although the Soviet Union has at different times proposed to
clear away "the residue of World War II," and moved in this
direction, the Russians have still been reluctant to eliminate certain
remnants of the defunct quadripartite occupation regime. These are:
(1) The Inter-Allied Air-Safety Center which regulates
-air traffic between West Berlin and the Federal Republic;
(2) the International War Crimes Prison in Spandau
(West Berlin) where soldiers of the four Powers take turns
in guarding the remaining three prisoners;
(3) the Soviet cenotaph in the British sector of West
Berlin, guarded by Soviet detachments;
(4) the Allied Military Commission in Potsdam (East
45. DOKuMExNTE ZUR BERLIN-FRAGE 154-155.
46. Electoral Law of June 15, 1949; DOKUIMENTE ZUR BERLIN-FRAGE, 133.
47. Law concerning the elections to the Volkskammer of August 9, 1950, Article 49:
subsequent electoral laws did not reiterate expressly that Berlin representatives have
consultative rights only, but they are still separately elected. Since there is in practice
no voting in the Volkskammer the voting rights play no role whatsoever; DOKUMENTE ZUR
BERLIN-FRAGE, 199, 191; Mampel, Dix VERFASSUNG DER SOWJETISCHEN BESATZUNGS-ZONE
DEUTSCHLANDS, 24-25, (1962).
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Germany) and the Soviet Military Commission in Frank-
furt/M. in the Federal Republic.
Other, more important souvenirs of the post-war military regime
affect the field of transportation and travel. Besides the access
rights to Berlin, Allied military personnel still exercise their right
of free circulation in East Berlin and in East Germany; conversely,
the Russians have similar rights in West Berlin and in the territory
of the Federal Republic.
In a declaration of 1952, reiterated at the time of the Paris
agreements of 1954, the Federal Republic promised financial assist-
ance and economic aid to Berlin. It pledged further "to ensure
the representation of Berlin and of the Berlin population outside
Berlin, and to facilitate the inclusion of Berlin in the international
agreements concluded by the Federal Republic, provided that this
is not precluded by the nature of the agreements concerned. ' 4 8
By virtue of this agreement, the Federal Government represents
the interests of (West) Berlin internationally as well as those of its
residents. The Federal Republic's trade agreements invariably in-
clude a "Berlin clause" which, not surprisingly, has created diffi-
culties with Bonn's Communist trade partners. However, upon the
Federal Government's insistence, Poland, Rumania, Hungary,
and Bulgaria have agreed to a text which, instead of directly
mentioning Berlin, recognized Bonn's right to represent the
"Deutsche Mark (West) area. 4 9 Since such a clause is a practical
recognition of West Germany's rights over Berlin, the Soviet refusal
to accept this formula has impeded Moscow's trade and cultural
relations with Bonn.
50
Inhabitants of West Berlin use passports of the Federal Republic
when travelling abroad; but they cannot identify themselves with
such passports when entering or passing through East Germany
or East Berlin. Federal Republic passports of West Berliners had
been frequently confiscated by agents of the German Democratic
Republic. East Berliners use East German passports, but only
outside West Germany or West Berlin, where they need to show their
identification papers and require no special entry or exit permits.
It should also be remembered that West German trade pacts
(concluded on behalf of West German trade interests by the
"inofficial" Treuhandstelle Fur Interzonenhandel in West Berlin)
with the German Democratic Republic also include West Berlin.
East German negotiators have tried several times to exclude West
48. von Oppen, DOCUMENTS ON GERMANY UNDER OCCUPATION, 1945-1954, 631-634 (1955).
49. In November, 1964, the Soviet Government refused to accept the West German
ratification documents of the nuclear test ban treaty because they provided for the in-
clusion of Berlin into the operational area of the treaty; New York Times, November 29,
1964, p. 53, col. 1.
50. New York Times, June 6, 1964, p. 2, col. 1.
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Berlin from such agreements and conclude conventions directly with
representatives of West Berlin. Occasionally, the Federal Republic
has had to make sacrifices in the bargaining procedure for retaining
the Berlin clause. The trade agreements also provide guarantees
for the travel of West Germans to and from West Berlin; but thus
far it has not been possible to extend similar general safeguards
for the inhabitants of the Western sections of Berlin.51
The theoretical and practical legal problems of Germany's
partition are compounded by involved conflicts between theory and
practice in Berlin. Both East and West Berlin pretend to be
"Greater Berlin"; the Federal Republic claims to be the sovereign
power of all Berlin, while the German Democratic Republic claims
the same sovereignty for itself. And the Western Allies consider
all of Berlin to be under the control of the Kommandatura, a three-
Power agency in reality, a four-Power agency in theory. These
theoretical divisions and their fictional character were accentuated
when the city became physically divided by the Wall in 1961.
The Western Occupation Powers refused to acknowledge any
change in the status of Berlin, as they conceived it, despite the
Wall and the liquidation of the office of Soviet Commandant in
Berlin on August 23, 1962. The Three Occupation Powers promptly
issued a communique stating that the abolition of the post of Soviet
Commandant did not destroy the authority of the Kommandatura
and asserting that
• . . the commandants in the Western sectors of Berlin
will continue to exercise their rights and discharge their
responsibilities both in their individual sectors and jointly in
the Kommandatura in accordance with long established pro-
cedures and agreements. They will continue to consider the
Soviet officials as responsible for carrying out their obliga-
tions regarding the Soviet Sector of Berlin.
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The Soviet campaign against West Berlin abated by 1964. After
the second Cuba crisis no major move took place, no new deadlines
were set and little was heard of the threat to conclude a separate
peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic. The final anti-
climax came in June 1964 when the Soviet Union concluded a Treaty
of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Co-operation with East Ger-
many. Before the signature of this instrument in Moscow, the
Kremlin gave official notice to the Western Powers that the treaty
to be signed would not be the oft-threatened "Peace Treaty" abolish-
ing Western rights in Berlin, including the access rights.53
The treaty signed by Khrushchev and Ulbricht on June 12, 1964,
51. New York Times, January 23, 1964, p. 7, col. 1.
52. New York Times, August 24, 1962, p. 2, col. 4. (italics added).
53. New York Times, June 12, 1964, p. 1, col. 1.
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contained nothing of a revolutionary nature. The signatories prom-
ised to work
... for the elimination of the remnants of World
War II, for the conclusion of a German Peace Treaty and
for the normalization of the situation in West Berlin on this
basis."
The Treaty, once more, guaranteed the "inviolability" of the
borders of the German Democratic Republic (which had already
been guaranteed by the Warsaw Treaty of 1955) and confirmed the
opinion that
• . . the creation of a peace-loving democratic united
German state can be achieved only through negotiations on
an equal footing and agreement between both sovereign
German states.5
As for Berlin, the Treaty merely affirmed that:
The High Contracting Parties will regard West Berlin
as an independent political unit.58
Thus the Treaty in no way suggested that West Berlin was part
of the German Democratic Republic. That Khrushchev had no
intention to confer further rights on the East German state, and that
no de facto change in existing arrangements was planned is made
evident by this provision:
The present Treaty does not affect the rights and com-
mitments of the Parties under the bilateral and other in-
ternational agreements which are in force, including the
Potsdam Agreement.57
It may be assumed that this text relates to the rights of control
which the Soviet Union had reserved for itself when the German
Democratic Republic was granted sovereignty. Thus the Treaty has
implicitly given up the earlier thought of extending East German
rights to the Western access routes to Berlin.
The basic policy goals of both the Federal Republic and the
German Democratic Republic are supported and inspired by the
constitutional-legal doctrines relative to Germany's present status.
Constitutional-legal theories spur the momentum of politics by
mingling political expediency with juridical arguments. In a country
like West Germany, where the majority of the civil service, the staff
of their Foreign Office, and a great many politicians and publicists
receive legal training, constitutional theories supporting the idea
of German unity-even if they are not always understandable to
54. The Treaty is printed in New York Times, June 13, 1964, p. 2, col. 3.
55. Id. at p. 2, col. 3.
56. Ibid.
57. Id. at p. 2, col. 4.
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the ordinary laymen- are of considerable political and practical
importance. Statements made by the Federal Government, diplo-
matic notes of the German Foreign Office, arguments advanced by
German legal scholars, writers and journalists are today under the
influence of the prevailing doctrines relative to Germany's inter-
national and constitutional legal status.
It is only natural that the Communist side has also developed
its own doctrinal legal explanations for the support of their political
positions and in refutation of the Western theses.
A political-legal doctrine that purports to explain the inner
aspirations of a nation is both a source of strength and weakness.
It is a comfortable guide-line for decision-making, a lode star for
public opinion, a standard by which actions or attitudes can be
measured. Doctrines often simplify decision-making but they may
hinder the solution of problems which could be solved if greater
flexibility would be employed. Such doctrines make policy-shapers
prone to inflexibility where suppleness would be expedient.
The doctrinaire-deductive approach to the problem of German
unity adopted by the leaders of West Germany may occasionally
clash sharply with the empirical-pragmatic thinking which prevails
in Washington as exemplified by the misapprehensions surrounding
Ambassador Grewe's mission in the American capital in 1962.
While the Federal Republic may, at times, be reproached by its
Allies for being too doctrinal and rigid, the Western Powers them-
selves are compelled to be scrupulously "legalistic" when defending
their rights in Berlin against Soviet and East German "nibbles."
It can and should never be ignored that the theoretical foundations
used for explaining the status of the Federal Republic of Germany,
of Berlin, and of the problems of Germany's unity are inseparable
from the understanding and appreciation of West German attitudes
and foreign policy toward the fundamental issue of reunification.
